

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ARA-16 EUR-25 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 AEC-11 AF-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-11 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NASA-04

NSAE-00 NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01 RSC-01

SCI-06 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 /211 R

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AEC:RSLAWSON

STATE/PM:LNOSENZO

STATE/SCI:JULOOM

STATE/EUR/RPE:GWOLFE

STATE/S/P:JKAHAN

S/S:WHLUERS

----- 110506

P 111947Z SEP 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 199563

E.O. 11652:XGDS1

TAGS: PARM, GW, US

SUBJECT: US-FRG CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION

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REF: IAEA V 7584

1. FRG GROUP HEADED BY AMB ROTH AND INCLUDING ANDREA AND RANDERMANN OF FONMIN AND GUTERMUTH OF ECONMIN MET AUGUST 29 WITH ACDA, STATE AND AEC OFFICIALS HEADED BY ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE, TO REVIEW BROAD RANGE OF NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. (DISCUSSION WITH ROTH OF OTHER ISSUES INCLUDING MBFR REPORTED SEPTEL.)

2. ROTH SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FRG TO DISCUSS THESE AREAS WITH US, AND TO HAVE ADVANCE INDICATION OF US POLICIES. THE FRG REPS. MADE CLEAR THAT THEIR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY WAS FIRM, THAT THEY WANTED TO COMPLETE THEIR NPT RATIFICATION SOON, AND THAT THEY SEE THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM AND EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH IT IN INCREASINGLY URGENT TERMS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FRG IS AT LEAST CONSIDERING SUBSTANTIALLY MORE RESTRICTIVE SAFEGUARDS/EXPORT POLICIES, AND IS TAKING A NEW LOOK AT THE ENTIRE "PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS" ISSUE. THEY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME FURTHER UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE FRG WILL PLACE CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE ON GAINING ACCEPTANCE BY OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS OF ANY MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES ADOPTED.

3. IKLE DISCUSSED THE IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONS THE US FACES IN PURSUING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY, INCLUDING DESIRABILITY OF INFLUENCING FURTHER INDIAN ACTIONS, OF INCLUDING FRANCE AND OTHER SUPPLIERS IN EXPORT POLICY DISCUSSIONS, AND THE COMPLICATIONS POSED BY SOVIET INTEREST IN PNE EXCAVATION.

4. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. ROTH SAID INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST HAS DESTROYED THRESHOLD THAT PREVIOUSLY DIVIDED COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY FROM NON-NUCLEARS. INDIAN TEST HAS REVIVED QUESTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED SETTLED, PARTICULARLY WHETHER OR NOT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CAN BE DISTINGUISHED FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS. ANY EFFORT TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION BY RECOGNIZING THREE CATEGORIES OF STATES, I.E. NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, NON-NUCLEARS, AND NON-WEAPON NUCLEAR STATE, AS SOME FAVOR (E.G. ITALY) WOULD

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MERELY PROMOTE PROLIFERATION. FRG FAVORS TREATING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES EXCLUSIVELY IN FRAMEWORK OF NPT ARTICLE V, BUT RECOGNIZES THIS DOES NOT ANSWER ALL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PNE'S, INCLUDING STATUS OF INDIAN PNE'S. ROTH THOUGHT PROLIFERATION OF PNE'S ON INDIAN MODEL INVOLVED SERIOUS DANGERS TO WORLD HEALTH AND SAFETY QUITE APART FROM NUCLEAR WEAPON ASPECT.

5. IKLE RECALLED RECENT US OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF PNE AND NUCLEAR WEAPON TECHNOLOGY, AND HE POINTED OUT THAT PNE AGREEMENT CALLED FOR IN ARTICLE III OF THRESHOLD TEST BAN WOULD HAVE NO RELEVANCE TO PROBLEM POSED BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE DEVELOPING PNE'S. HE COMMENTED THAT, SINCE US PNE'S ARE CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS AND DO NOT RELEASE RADIOACTIVITY INTO THE ATMOSPHERE, THE DEVICES NEED NOT BE FISSION-FREE.

6. ROTH ASKED US VIEWS ON WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO TREAT PNE'S ENTIRELY IN NPT FRAMEWORK OR ALTERNATIVELY TO ACCEPT OTHER APPROACHES, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT OF LATIN AMERICA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY. CURRENT FRG ATTITUDE IS THAT ANY REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, TO BE ACCEPTABLE, SHOULD STRENGTHEN, NOT UNDERMINE, NPT. IKLE SAID THIS COINCIDED WITH CURRENT USG THINKING, NAMELY THAT REGIONAL RESTRAINTS SUCH AS THOSE OF LANFZ CAN BE USEFUL ADJUNCTS TO NPT- CONCEIVABLY LANFZ COULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR SOME FURTHER RESTRAINT ON LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL THAT ARE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT NPT. ROTH NOTED OTHER NUCLEAR FREE ZONE PROPOSALS WILL BE DISCUSSED AT UNGA AND DISCUSSION COULD PROMOTE NON-PROLIFERATION. IRANIAN PROPOSAL FOR MID-EAST NFZ POSES PARTICULAR PROBLEM, HOWEVER, SINCE ZONE WOULD

NECESSARILY INCLUDE NATO ALLY TURKEY.

7. NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE. ROTH EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PREPARATIONS FOR NPT CONFERENCE AND IN WHETHER US APPROACH TO CONFERENCE HAS BEEN MODIFIED IN WAKE OF INDIAN TEST. HE WAS TOLD US IS PROCEEDING ALONG SAME GENERAL LINES PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH FRG. WE ADDED WE STRONGLY HOPE FRG, AS WELL AS OTHER EURATOM COUNTRIES, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND JAPAN, WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN REVIEW CONFERENCE AS PARTIES. ROTH ASKED ABOUT US PLANS FOR POSSIBLE ACTION ON PHYSICAL SECURITY ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH NPT CONFERENCE.

8. CANADIAN REACTOR SALE TO ARGENTINA. RANDERMANN REFERRED TO ISSUE OF SAFEGUARDS DURATION CLAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH CANADIAN REACTOR SALE TO ARGENTINA, WHICH MAY ARISE AT SEPTEMBER 13 IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING. HE EXPRESSED VIEW ISSUE SHOULD BE POSTPONED IF POSSIBLE BUT HE FELT CERTAIN FRG WOULD OPPOSE ARGENTINE POSITION IF ISSUE SHOULD COME BEFORE BOARD.

9. IN LATER TECHNICAL SESSION, FRG GROUP, INCLUDING LOOSCH, AND GUTERMUTH, MET WITH STATE, ACDA, AND AEC REPS. RANDERMANN POSED QUESTION WHETHER "NPT IS ENOUGH" OR WHETHER OTHER EXPORT RESTRAINTS OR POLICIES ARE

NECESSARY. (COMMENT: FRG DID NOT GO AS FAR AS PARA. 2 OF REFTTEL, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT SUCH IDEAS WERE AT LEAST OPEN TO CONSIDERATION.) HE SAID FRG IS FACING DECISIONS ON THE EXPORT OF CENTRIFUGES TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES, WHICH HE IMPLIED, INCLUDE AT LEAST ONE UNIDENTIFIED NPT PARTY ABOUT WHICH THEY HAVE DOUBTS. FRG REPS INDICATED THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO COORDINATE EXPORT POLICIES WITH OTHERS AND WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO RESTRAINT UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH SHOULD, HOWEVER, INCLUDE ALL MAJOR SUPPLIERS.

10. US REPS OUTLINED RECENT US THINKING ON EXPORT GUIDELINES, MAKING CLEAR THAT, FOR SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND CERTAIN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IS NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR EXPORT. IN THOSE CASES ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OR LIMITATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED SUCH AS THOSE USG WOULD REQUIRE FOR REACTOR SALES TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL. US AND FRG REPS AGREED THAT SPECIAL CONSTRAINTS ON SUPPLY OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND FUEL REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND THAT REGIONAL OR MULTINATIONAL REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT PLANTS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MANY NATIONAL PLANTS. THE NEED TO INCLUDE CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS WAS STRESSED BY BOTH SIDES, AND A TENTATIVE LIST OF SUCH SUPPLIERS (INCLUDING THE UK, USSR, FRANCE, CANADA, JAPAN, SWEDEN, NETHERLANDS,

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ITALY, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS) WAS DISCUSSED. FRG REPS SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED SERIES OF PRIVATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, BROADENED AFTER SOME COMMON VIEWS WERE CLEAR. THEY RECOGNIZED THE DESIRABILITY OF INCLUDING FRENCH VERY EARLY. THEY WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE AN EARLY FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSION WITH US, TO CONSIDER THE EXPORT CHOICES NOW FACING THEM. THE US REPS AGREED THAT SUCH A FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSION SHOULD BE HELD.

11. ONE POSSIBILITY DISCUSSED WAS A "CONSULTATIVE BODY" OF SUPPLIER NATIONS TO WHICH MEMBERS COULD REFER UNUSUAL REQUESTS FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, OR TECHNOLOGY. THIS CONCEPT WOULD PERMIT ANY SUPPLIER NATION TO OBTAIN COLLECTIVE VIEWS OF OTHER SUPPLIERS ON INFORMAL CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, HEREBY AVOIDING "SURPRISES". IT WAS GENERALLY FELT THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE COULD SUPPLEMENT AGREED GUIDELINES. FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A GROUP WAS CONSIDERED MORE LIKELY THAN IN A FORMAL SUPPLIER NATION ORGANIZATION.

12. WITH REGARD TO PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FRG REPS SAID FRG IS INTERESTED IN WHAT CAN BE DONE IN-

TERNATIONALLY BUT NEVERTHELESS REGARDS MATTER AS  
PRIMARILY NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. BOTH SIDES AGREED  
THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE IAEA  
CONTEXT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. RANDERMANN DOUBTED  
UTILITY OF PURSUING PHYSICAL SECURITY ISSUE AT UNGA.  
US REPS SAID WE ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER AN INTERNATIONAL  
AGREEMENT ON PHYSICAL SECURITY WOULD BE USEFUL. WE DID  
NOT ENVISAGE IT AS BEING "NEGOTIATED" AT THE NPT  
REVIEW CONFERENCE.

13. IN A LATER SESSION, ROTH AND IKLE DISCUSSED THE  
SITUATION WITH REGARD TO ITALY AND NPT RATIFICATION.  
ROTH MENTIONED THE VARIETY OF ARGUMENTS THEY HAVE HEARD  
FROM ITALY, AND THE UNCLEAR SCHEDULE FOR ITALIAN  
NPT RATIFICATION. DUCCI HAS TOLD HIM THEY MAY SUBMIT  
THE NPT TO THE PARLIAMENT RIGHT AFTER THE VERIFICATION  
AGREEMENT IS APPROVED. ROTH SAID IT IS STILL THE FRG IN-  
TENTION TO DEPOSIT INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AS SOON  
AS POSSIBLE. KISSINGER  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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